刘森林
论文题目：矛盾的现代省思--对马克思主义群体辩证法的一种思考
作者简介：刘森林，男，1965年07月出生，1998年09月师从于中山大学叶汝贤教授，于2001年06月获博士学位。
摘 要
关于辩证法的研究近年来在国内哲学界基本处于边缘甚至沉寂状态。而关于“矛盾”等传统辩证法话语在现代辩证法研究中的地位更是无人问津。在这种情形下，力求使辩证法的研究从传统术语中推陈出新地进入当前的前沿性论域，就显得非常必要，也富有价值。本文的论题由此得以确立。它从区分柏拉图对话辩证法、黑格尔理性辩证法、克尔凯郭尔个体生存辩证法和马克思实践辩证法入手，致力于探讨“社会世界”中的矛盾辩证法。
本文引言部分提出，马克思实践辩证法的焦点不是“自然世界”，更不是“物品世界”，也不是“意义世界”；而是立足于自然世界和物品世界、并面对着意义世界的“社会世界”。现代意识形态力欲弱化甚至割断“社会世界”与“自然世界”、“物品世界”的联系，并把它隐匿在“物品世界”中。从“社会世界”中探索实践辩证法将为辩证法研究提供一个富有意义的新方向。通过针对社会世界提出的各种批判性观点，特别是集体行动理论（奥尔森）、自由主义（勒庞）和“西方马克思主义”（哈贝马斯）的批评性观点，我们可以找到丰富和发展马克思主义辩证法的一个新方向和新天地。
在第一章中，本文认为，“矛盾”不应只是个逻辑概念，更应系指群体实践合作中的自否定和自悖谬。黑格尔的“矛盾”系指内在的自否定，不是外在的对立统一。继承黑格尔、告别旧形而上学的马克思所使用的“矛盾”概念也应与抽象的“对立统一”（可能是外在的对立统一）相区别。文章在吉登斯分类的基础上进一步把“矛盾”分为生存性、结构性、人际性和生活性四类，认为马克思的“矛盾”范式不同于黑格尔的“矛盾”范式；马克思的“矛盾”分析更多地集中在结构性矛盾上，而对社会群体中的人际性矛盾关注相对较少。现代哲学特别是社会理论在此方面提出的众多新问题需要我们更多地予以关注、研究。本文的论题正由此确立。
在接下来第二、三章的论述中，本文致力于从制度与矛盾的联系中观视“矛盾”。现代制度体系难以规治的“外推”和认可了的合理性“外推”导致了众多的群体自否定和自悖谬；现代制度和发展主义对平等、富足不切实际的大口许诺更强化了这种自己否定自己的荒谬性。外推空间的扩大使现代社会内含着更多更大的自否定和自悖谬；并使“外推空间”和“总体性”成为现代辩证法的重要概念和观察维度。文章还对群体合作困境的马克思主义来源、对恩格斯的平均值合力论提出了自己的看法；通过对自我放弃行动自控权的极致性外推及其社会后果的分析呼唤群体理性。在此基础上，本文对萨特在群体中探寻辩证理性的群体理论做了分析，肯定其群体理论对于马克思主义的群体辩证法是一大贡献，但对“制度”的不信任则显得偏颇。制度通过“外推”、个人主义“内化”等机制对“矛盾”的规治在特定区域内能达到相当的效果；而对制度功能的忽视和对制度与生产力一体化趋势的忽视会给我们造成众多的遮蔽。当代中国现代性制度的缺失与不足、制度安排间的相互冲突和制度分化水平的低下势必导致众多的群体自否定；以制度规约社会“矛盾”仍是我们的长期任务。本文还强调注意“矛盾”制度化的后果：两种“代码”之间的密切联系、单纯主体性的片面和不可靠性；整体性对因果性的取代；“失范”和异化感的加强。
最后一章则主要立足于马克思、卢卡奇以及弗洛姆和海德格尔等人的有关理论分析作为特殊“矛盾”的异化。批评了把异化等同于分化，把异化作为科学历史观范畴等做法；指出了异化与个人主义背景、与主客体二分法的内在关联，与现代早期颇有小生产色彩的劳动乌托邦的密切联系；分析了异化话语的唯理主义背景，以及异化与物化的关联。主张区分物化不足引发的异化、自主性缺失引发的异化与物化充溢引发的异化——后者即是物化世界对意义世界的遮蔽，是“常人”之间相互“密集的社会认同”，在某种意义上也正是现代制度的内在要求。
最后，本文提出，从崇拜“实践”到反思内生着自悖谬的现代“实践”，并由此展开“实践”思维的自批判，展开“实践”内在（如劳动价值论与物化批判论之间）的张力结构的自我剖析，走向“完成”意义上的“后”实践哲学，是进一步从“实践哲学”中挖掘有利于日后中国哲学发展的理论资源的必由之路。
Abstract
Researches about dialectics have basically remained on a fringe or even drowsy state in recent years. Moreover, the status of those traditional terms such as “contradiction” in modern dialectic researches also keeps rarely discussed. In this case, it becomes more necessary and valuable to turn out dialectic researches to be the frontier from traditional terms in a new way. And that brings about the thesis of the article. The thesis, which starts with a clear distinction between Platonic Dialogic Dialectic, Hegelian Rational Dialectic, Kierkegaardian Individual Existential Dialectic and Marxian Practice Dialectic, commits itself to discussing the Dialectic of Contradiction in a “social world”.
In introduction, it puts forward that the focus of Marx’s practical dialectic is not “the natural world” or “the goods-world”, or “the meaning world”, but “the social world” which bases itself upon “the natural world” and “the goods-world” and faces to “the meaning world”. Modern ideology tends to weaken or even cut the connection between “the natural world” and “the goods-world” and faces to “the meaning world”, then hide it in “the goods-world”. To explore practical dialectic from “the social world” will offer a significant new way for dialectic researches. By means of pointing at those critical viewpoints towards “the social world, especially the collective action theory ( Mancur Oison), liberalism(Gustave Le Bon ), and Western Marxism theory(Jürgen Habermas), we can find a new field to enrich and develop Marxism ’s dialectic.
In Chapter One, It holds that “contradiction” should not be considered merely as a logical concept; rather it refers to self-negation and self-paradox in the process of groups’ practical cooperation. Instead of an external opposition and unity, Hegelian “contradiction” indicates some kind of internal self-negation. Therefore, the concept of “contradiction” developed by Marx, which somewhat inherits that of Hegel and entirely abandons the old metaphysics, should be differentiated from an abstract “opposition and unity” (maybe an external opposition and unity). On the basis of Giddens’ classification, the thesis classifies “contradiction” into four categories: the existential, the structural, the interpersonal and the contradiction in life. It claims that the paradigm of “contradiction” of Marx is foreign to that of Hegel, for Marx focuses his attention on the structural contradiction and attaches less importance to the interpersonal contradiction in social groups. We should pay more attention to the new problems on this aspect put forward by modern philosophy and it is the very theme this paper intends to dealwith.
In the following Chapter 2 and 3, the paper seeks to examine closely “contradiction” by connecting it with institutions. The unlimited and increasing “extrapolation”, no matter whether it is hard to be standardized by modern institutions or that has already been accepted and rationalized, leads to so many self-negation and self-paradox in groups. Those unrealistic promises of equality and affluence made by modern institutions and developmentalism seriously deepen such absurdity. The expansion of “extrapolating space” results in more and more inherent self-negation and self-paradox, and for this reason, “extrapolating space” and “totality” become important concepts and offer us a peculiar perspective on modern dialectics. In addition, the paper traces the Marxist source of groups’ cooperative dilemma and puts forth the author’s own opinion with regard to Engels’ theory of join forces and average. In doing so, the author attempts to call our attention to group’s rationality by means of forsaking an exceeding extrapolation of the right of self-control and analyzing its corresponding results. Grounded on this analysis, the paper further investigates Sartre’s Group Theory that searches for dialectical reason in groups, claiming that although this theory no doubt contributes to the group reason, his suspicion on “institutions” seems somewhat prejudiced. The regularization and restrictions, which are imposed on the “contradiction” by institutions through such mechanisms as “extrapolating”, individualism’s internalization, can achieve considerable effects in some specific fields；however, any indifference to the function of institutions and to the trend of integration of institutions and productivity will ultimately distance ourselves from truth and make us confused by appearance. In contemporary China, the want and imperfection of the modern institutions, the mutually conflicts of institutional arrangements and the low level of institutional differentiation will definitely result in lots of groups’ self-negation; therefore, regulating the social “contradiction” through institutions is still our long-run task. The thesis also appeals to pay more attention to the consequences of the institutionalization of “contradiction”, that is, the close relationship between two sorts of codes, one-sidedness and unreliability of pure subjectivity, the substitution of wholeness for causality and the intensification of anomie and sense of alienation.
Grounded on the related theories of Marx, Lukacs,
Fromm and Heidegger, the last chapter explores more specifically “alienation”
by taking it as some kind of special “contradiction”. The thesis criticizes
such mistakes as equating “alienation” with differentiation and putting
alienation into historical categories. It points out the intrinsic and background
of intimate relations between alienation and individualism, the subject-object
dichotomy and the Labor Utopia in early modern times which is characterized by
small-scale productivity. Meanwhile, it also analyzes the rationalist
background of discourse of “alienation”, and the connection between alienation
and reification. The paper holds that we should make a clear distinction
between the alienation caused by deficiency of reification, that arising out of
loss of autonomy and that caused by excess of reification. The latter, which
means not only concealment of the meaning world by the reified world but also
the mutually “social identification” of “das Man”, is in a sense the internal
demand of modern institutions.
In the end, the paper stresses its theme again: undergoing a radical transformation from blindly adoring “practice” to reflecting the contradiction that inheres in the “modern practice”, we realize that only when we introduce a self-criticism of practice and a self-analysis of its inherent structure of tension can we be led to some kind of “post” practical philosophy in the sense of “completion”. Thus is the only way to dig out useful theoretical resources from the “practical philosophy” for the development of Chinese philosophy.
