刘长永

 

 

论文题目:沉默权制度研究

 

作者简介:孙长永,男,196408月出生,199809月师从于西南政法大学徐静村教授,于200107月获博士学位。

 

 

 

 

本博士论文由绪论和四章构成,其中,每一章都由“引言”、正文和“本章小结”三部分组成。

绪论部分对沉默权的基本含义作了解释,指出沉默权有广义和狭义两种理解。广义理解既包括犯罪嫌疑人的拒绝回答权、指控后不被讯问的权利以及被告人在庭审中不作证的权利,也包括知情人的拒绝回答权和证人不自陷于罪的权利;狭义理解仅指受到特定犯罪嫌疑的人和被告人在整个刑事诉讼过程中对于来自官方的提问拒绝回答或者完全保持沉默的权利。英美法采广义理解,大陆法及日本法采狭义理解,二者的区别导源于刑事被告人的诉讼地位不同以及沉默权与自白任意性法则之间的关系不同。本文的研究侧重于狭义的沉默权。

第一章对沉默权产生和发展的历史过程进行了粗线条式的描述,揭示了沉默权发展演变的基本线索和历史条件。文章认为从世界范围来看,沉默权的产生和发展大体上经历了四个阶段:一是作为沉默权存在前提的“不自我控告”权利的确立,其标志是教会法院和王室特别法院盛行的“职权宣誓”程序的废止,着重点是废除被告人的宣誓义务;二是“不被强迫自证其罪”权利的确立,其标志是美国联邦宪法第五修正案的规定:“任何人不得在任何刑事案件中被迫充当不利于自己的证人”,着重点是反对刑讯逼供或以其他非宣誓性的方法获得作为定罪依据的口供;三是沉默权作为一种通常的法律权利的完全确立,在英国表现为嫌疑人在预审阶段被告知不回答提问的权利以及成文法对被告人作证资格的确认,在美国则表现为联邦最高法院将不自证其罪的特权解释为沉默权,并扩大适用于警察的侦讯阶段;四是沉默权在国际人权法上的确认和发展,其标志是《公民权利与政治权利国际公约》和其他有关国际公约对于这一权利的确认以及国际性人权法院对于相关规定的司法解释。文章以“四阶段说”为基础,依次追溯了沉默权的思想渊源、沉默权在两大法系的产生和发展、沉默权在国际人权法上的确认和发展过程,并且介绍了沉默权在英国、新加坡和爱尔兰受到限制的情况。

第二章对主要法治国家沉默权制度的内容进行了比较详细的考察。认为从总体上说,沉默权制度的基本内容包括行使沉默权的规则、放弃或抵消沉默权的规则以及沉默权的保障规则三个方面。根据第一个方面的规则,任何人对于可能使自己受到刑事追究的事实在面临官方询问或讯问时都有权拒绝回答或者保持沉默,其中最重要的是嫌疑人在接受侦查官员的讯问时有权沉默以及被告人在法庭审理过程中有权拒绝作证或者不向法庭陈述案情,不受强制,并且原则上不因此而受到来自官方的不利评论以及事实裁判者的不利推论。根据第二个方面的规则,在符合法定条件时,权利人可以放弃沉默权,侦查、追诉机关也可以经过法定程序赋予利害关系人以作证豁免权,然后强迫沉默权的主体提供自证其罪的证词,但由此所获得的陈述或其他证据原则上不得在随后的刑事诉讼中用作不利陈述人的证据。根据第三个方面的规则,官方在讯问嫌疑人或要求被告人陈述案情之前,必须依据法定的程序和形式告知犯罪嫌疑人和被告人所受到的指控以及有权保持沉默或拒绝陈述,多数国家还要求一并告知嫌疑人享有律师帮助的权利,并且通过提供律师帮助、规范讯问的具体程序、限制侦查机关对在押犯罪嫌疑人的控制时间和条件、要求主审法官对陪审团依法做出适当的指示等措施,预防沉默权受到来自官方的侵犯;法院如果认定审前阶段的沉默权受到侦查、起诉官员或预审法官的侵犯时,应当根据权利人及其辩护律师的申请或依职权排除由此而获得的证据;如果在一审程序中采纳了因侵犯审前阶段的沉默权而获得的证据,或者被告人在法庭审理过程中的沉默权受到侵犯,权利人有权以此为由对有罪判决提出上诉。文章认为,虽然沉默权已经得到各法治国家的普遍认可,但各国沉默权制度的具体内容并不相同,不仅英美法系的沉默权制度不同于大陆法系的沉默权制度,而且英国与美国的沉默权制度也不完全一致。

鉴于沉默权是一项富有争议的权利,文章第三章评析了英美两国关于沉默权的争论过程与争论内容,然后从理论上论证了沉默权的正当根据和诉讼价值,并对沉默权的绝对性与相对性作了剖析。文章指出,自十九世纪以来,英美两国对于沉默权一直存有争议,争论的焦点主要不在于被追诉者是否应当有沉默权,而在于有什么样的沉默权。不论参与争论的各方是否承认沉默权存在正当根据,没有任何人主张恢复被追诉者的“供述义务”。英国关于沉默权的争论主要集中于是否应当允许从沉默中做出不利的推论,如何推论;美国关于沉默权的争论主要集中于“米兰达”规则的必要性和可行性,未经警告程序所获得的供述是否一定不可采。争论的结果是:在英国导致立法对沉默权进行了一定的限制,允许在严格限定的条件下从沉默中做出不利于被告人的推论,在美国导致“米兰达规则”的效力范围受到一定的影响,但其核心内容没有改变。两种不同结果的出现不仅与两国沉默权的原有法律地位不同有关,也与两国的宪政原则不同有直接的关系。文章认为,沉默权是一项有道德基础的权利。在现代社会,它主要被视为根植于人的尊严、与人性共存的基本人权,也是无罪推定原则的内在要求。作为刑事司法国际准则之一,它的诉讼价值得到法治国家的一致肯定:它是平衡刑事诉讼中的政府权力与个人权利、维持程序公正的一项重要条件;有助于促进政府以独立的证据证明被告人的罪行,准确地起诉和定罪,保障无罪的人不受刑事追究;还有利于防止政府滥用刑事程序中的官方权力,维持公众对于刑事程序的普遍信任。由于沉默权可能导致部分罪犯逃脱法网,一些国家出于保护公共利益的需要对它进行了不同程度的限制,如允许以“程序强制”的方法获取言词证据,或者允许从沉默中做出不利推论等,但由于这些限制本身附带有严格的条件,沉默权的基本精神并没有受到损害。坚持和发展沉默权制度,仍然是当前世界的一种国际性趋势

第四章将研究的重点由国外转向国内,首先论证了中国现行法对于沉默权的态度及其主要原因,然后结合理论界分歧意见,依次剖析了中国建立沉默权制度的必要性和可行性,最后就中国近期内应当建立的沉默权制度提出了初步设想,并对如何创造条件建立和发展沉默权制度提出了五项建议。文章认为,中国现行法没有规定犯罪嫌疑人、被告人有沉默权,相反,它要求犯罪嫌疑人在面对侦查人员的讯问时“应当如实回答”,这其中既有政治、社会原因,也有诉讼制度本身的原因,还有文化传统方面的原因。为了促进国内刑事诉讼制度的民主化,履行国际法规定的义务,并维持社会公众对于刑事程序的信心,中国应当尽快通过修改立法的方式建立沉默权制度,而不应当在已经向国际社会做出庄严承诺的情况下在国内立法和司法实务上裹足不前。从现有条件来看,建立沉默权制度的确存在不少障碍,但也存在很多有利因素,而且这些有利因素还在不断发展之中,因此,建立沉默权制度已经基本可行。在设计沉默权制度的具体方案时,应当从沉默权是一项基本人权的高度出发,着眼于“确认”权利,而非“限制”权利,同时也要注意我国的现有条件及其近期内的变化趋势,充分考虑到社会的接受程度以及沉默权制度可能给司法实务带来的不利影响。为了实现沉默权制度的立法化,并且保证这一制度的有效实施,必须进一步转变诉讼观念,健全相关证据规则,充实律师辩护制度,逐步完善侦查讯问程序,改革侦查体制和法院体制,以便在维持程序的真实发现功能的同时,最大限度地发挥沉默权制度的人权保障机能。

 

Abstract

 

This Ph.D. dissertation has four chapters besides an introduction, and each of the chapters consists of an introduction of itself, the main part and a conclusion.

The Introduction of the dissertation is a concise explanation of the right to silence. In Anglo-American literature, the "right to silence" refers to a bundle of rights, ranging from a general right of refusing to answer any official inquiry and a witness's right not to incriminate himself, to a specific right of a suspect not to answer police interrogations and that of an accused not to testify in court of his own trial. In Continental Europe and Japan, it only denotes a specific right of a suspect or an accused not to answer any official questioning, either in front of police and prosecutors or in court. This difference in understanding the right to silence is closely related with the legal status of accused persons in criminal proceedings and different rationale of rules limiting the admissibility of confessions. The author adopts a narrow understanding of the right to silence in this dissertation.

It is proclaimed in the first chapter that the history of the right to silence can be divided roughly into four stages. At the earliest stage, it was a right not to accuse oneself, established following the abolishment of the "ex officio oaths" used by royal prerogative courts such as the Star Chamber and church courts. At the second stage, it was expressed in the formulation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution: "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself". At the third stage, a general right to silence was fully recognized in front of any judicial questioning and was later extended to police interrogation. Finally, it was written into the International Covenant on Civil Rights and Political Rights and other documents of the United Nations, and the right to silence became one of the minimum protective standards worldwide for a fair trial. The author traces the origins of the right back to Christian beliefs and medieval common law of the Continent and provides an overview of the historical developments in England, the colonial America, the United States, Continental Europe and Japan. In the Conclusion of Chapter One, the author puts out four points regarding the contexts and conditions for the advent and developments of the right to silence.

Chapter two delineates minutely the basic rules concerning the right to silence in major legal systems. The author summarizes different rules into three categories. The first consists of rules relating to the exercise of the right by which no person can be compelled to incriminate himself, among which the right not to answer police questioning and the right not testify in court are the most critical. In principle, no inference can be drawn from the refusal or failure to answer or testify, and no comment is permitted as a result. Secondly, there are rules of waiver aiming at encouraging people to tell and that of immunity forcing witnesses to testify. The third category is a combination of protective rules ranging from warning requirements, rules concerning the assistance of lawyers, to those of preventive measures and remedies. By comparison, the author comes to the view that the rules relating to the right to silence are not only different in four respects between the common law system and the European system, but also between the United Kingdom and the United States in five points.

Bearing in mind that the right to silence has long been a subject of heated debate and that domestic debate over this right is largely a rehearsal of that in alternative jurisdictions, the author tries to outline the major issues discussed in the United Kingdom and the United States. It is claimed that although there has been constant attack on the right to silence in both countries, no one has ever advanced an argument that it should be replaced with a general legal duty to answer. While the debate in the UK focused on the appropriateness of inference from silence, the debate of the right in the USA concerned basically with Miranda's warning and waiver requirements. The former has temporarily resulted in severe limitations of the right both in police interviews and in court, the latter has only reduced Miranda's impact upon legitimate law enforcement, but the decision's core ruling was sustained. The reason of this contrast lies in the different legal status of the right to silence and different constitutional rules in the UK and the USA.. In the author's view, the right to silence is a legal right with sound moral basis. In modern society, it is regarded as a fundamental human right inherent in human integrity and an implicit requirement of the presumption of innocence. The procedural values as one of the international standards of criminal justice have been universally recognized. Whether it is an absolute right beyond any legislative or judicial restriction is controversial, but generally speaking, the worldwide trend is towards securing not tempering with the right.

       The Chinese law as it stands now does not include a right to silence. In fact, it imposes a duty on the accused to tell the truth. Failure or refusal to tell, or telling a false story has always been taken into account when determining the sentence. This position of Chinese law is a result of a combination of factors embraced in the political structure, social ideology of individual rights and traditional culture of the Chinese characteristics. It is argued that the right to silence is necessary for the Mainland China both to promote procedural fairness in criminal cases and to keep people's confidence upon rule of law. Besides, the Chinese Government has signed the International Covenant on Civil Rights and Political Rights as well as other UN documents, e.g. the Convention on Children's Rights, in which a right to silence or not to incriminate oneself is explicitly guaranteed. There is no excuse for an opened China to refuse to discharge an international obligation. Although quite a few obstacles do exist in the way, there are lots of circumstances favoring introducing the right to silence into China. The problem of feasibility should be seriously considered while choosing the specific rules relating to the right. Three different legislative schemes are proposed at the end of the fourth chapter, with detailed explanation for the first one, which might be the only one that could possibly be accepted in the near future. The author calls for taking more active measures to facilitate the legislation and enforcement.

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