论文题目：工资、就业的议价对经济效率的影响
作者简介：陆铭，男,1973年03月出生，1999年01月师从于复旦大学袁志刚教授，于2001年07月获博士学位。
摘
要
这篇论文是一项考察工资和就业决定机制的研究，理解工资和就业的决定机制是理解劳动力市场，进而理解经济运行的基础。本文的主体部分所要回答的问题主要有三个：(1)在中国的经济转轨时期，企业的工资水平和就业数量是怎样决定的？(2)在这样的工资与就业决定机制下，国有部门的经济效率将受到怎样的影响？(3)在就业体制改革过程中，为什么国有企业与非国有企业间的劳动生产率差异越来越大？为了回答这些问题，我们运用了议价理论(bargaining
theory)作为基本的分析方法，而这一研究本身也构成了对于工资和就业议价理论的一个发展。
与其他转轨经济国家一样，中国转轨时期的经济体制脱胎于计划经济体制。所不同的是，由于中国采取了渐进的改革方式，使得中国转轨时期的经济体制呈现出了独特的特征。在就业体制方面，转轨时期的国有部门仍然受到来自于政府的工资和就业管制，而非国有部门则能够自由地进行工资和就业的决策。在国有部门，受到传统体制的影响，劳动力还没有通过自己的组织(比如工会)形成与企业进行工资和就业议价的制度框架。而在非国有部门，由于劳动力的收入水平较高，企业又有较为自由的解雇职工的权利，因此劳动力也处于相对的弱势，职工缺乏动力组织起来争取更高的工资和更多的就业。鉴于以上制度背景，在本文中，我们认为劳动力对工资的影响是通过效率工资(efficiency
wage)机制来达到的，也就是说，职工可以根据工资水平选择自己的努力水平，这样企业在进行工资和就业的最优决策时，就不得不考虑到职工的行为选择。反映国有部门和非国有部门区别的关键是政府在国有部门仍然实施着对于工资和就业的控制。提高就业和控制工资增长是传统体制下政府的目标，但在经济转轨时期，这种控制已经不象在计划经济体制时期那样完全是一种强制性的控制了。国有企业已经形成了自己的利润目标，企业的管理者更是有自己的经济目标，来自于企业的声音也对于政府的政策也有影响。在政府和企业间的议价框架之下，我们可以清楚地表明，中国转轨时期的工资和就业是在企业目标和政府目标的相互作用下决定的。
对于第二和第三个问题的回答是联系在一起的。我们试图证明，在二元就业体制下，政府对国有部门的工资和就业决策的干预，既保障了社会稳定，也损害了国有部门的效率。尽管我们不能否认国有企业的低效率与所有制有关，但是，我们认为对转轨时期国有企业低效率现象的解释首先应该从政府的干预入手。本文的理论模型说明，转轨时期国有和非国有两个部门在就业体制上的差异可以解释两个部门的效率差异。我们还发现，在政府对国有企业仍然采取工资与就业的管制的情况下，越是改善对企业管理者的激励，越是使得管理者有激励去追求政府的目标，增加企业的就业，压低职工的工资。因此，在保留对企业的工资和就业的管制的情况下，激励机制的改革不是改善了企业的绩效，而是使得企业的绩效进一步恶化。由于就业体制改革的规则是先从效益差的企业入手，而且就业体制的改革往往还伴随着企业的非国有化过程，因此存量国有企业往往是那些绝对效益较好的企业，政府对这些企业仍然保留着一定程度的工资和就业管制，这就造成了不同所有制企业间的相对的劳动生产率差异在改革过程中不断扩大！
本文的主要结论是：(1)由于转型期间国有企业的工资和就业是受到政府管制的，因此，国有部门存在着一定规模的过剩就业，同时国有企业的工资是被压低的，这时，国有企业的工资和就业一定会偏离企业利润最大化时的最优水平。(2)在改革过程中，一些绩效较差的国有企业在实行就业体制市场化改革的同时，也进行了非国有化（或被关闭），而剩下的构成存量的国有企业却往往是那些绩效较好的国有企业。但绩效较好却成了政府延缓这些企业就业体制改革的理由，由于仍然受着来自于政府的工资和就业管制，存量国有企业与非国有企业间的工资差距和效率差距可能会越来越大，而在存在政府管制的情况下，国有企业管理者的激励机制改革只会使国有企业的相对劳动生产率进一步恶化。
本文所隐含的政策含义是显然的。为了让国有企业得以在市场上与非国有企业平等竞争，并且使得激励机制改革真正有效，应该放弃对国有企业工资和就业的控制。而为了改变政府和企业进行工资和就业议价的格局，必须改革国有企业的人事制度，使企业不再过多地追求政府部门的目标。
本文的理论创新在于：(1)本文在对国有企业的工资和就业决定进行建模的基础上研究了不同所有制企业间的效率差异成因，解释了为何国有企业的相对劳动生产率在改革后总体上呈下降趋势。本文的结论是，有效的激励机制改革必须以政府放松对企业的管制为前提，否则改革的效果适得其反。这一观点为理解国有企业效率的影响因素和它的变化提供了新的视角。相比之下，已有的理论均不能够很好地解释为什么国有企业的劳动生产率相对恶化的现象，也没有充分地重视政府管制给经济效率造成的影响。(2)如果我们用工资和就业议价的参与者作为一个维度，用工资和就业议价的体制背景作为另一个维度的话，那么就可以将工资与就业的议价模型划分为四大类，即市场体制下的企业与工会(职工)议价模型、市场体制下企业与政府议价模型、转轨体制下的企业与工会(职工)议价模型和转轨体制下企业与政府议价模型。目前已有的工资和就业议价模型可以分别归入前三类，而本文的工作则是第四类中唯一的一个模型，这也是本文对于工资和就业议价理论的一个发展。(3)
本文首次将议价理论运用于模拟中国国有企业中政府与企业通过协商决定工资和就业的机制。本文在已有的中文文献中，较早地系统总结了议价理论及其发展，为该理论在中国的推广打下了基础。
本文的结构安排如下。导论之后的第二章进行了一个议价理论的述评，其中将重点介绍议价理论的两个分支，即由纳什开创的公理性的合作博弈议价理论，和以鲁宾斯坦模型为代表的战略性的非合作博弈议价理论。第三章是一个针对工资和就业议价模型的综述，其中包括了最具有代表性的管理权模型和效率议价模型这两个企业与职工间的议价模型，以及一个企业与政府之间的就业议价模型。从第四章开始，我们转入对转轨经济中工资与就业决定机制的研究。除了对一些相关文献进行了评论以外，我们还基于东欧转轨经济的体制构造了一个包括政府工资总额管制的企业和职工之间的工资和就业议价模型。
从第五章起是我们对于中国转轨经济体制下工资与就业决定机制及其对经济效率的影响的研究。在第五章中，我们首先对中国转轨时期的二元就业体制进行了一个描述，并对这一体制下国有部门和非国有部门不同的工资与就业决定机制进行了界定。由此，我们说明了为什么公理性的议价理论同样可以用于研究中国转轨时期工资和就业的决定机制，同时，我们也讨论了政府、企业和职工在工资和就业的议价过程中所起的作用。在第六章中我们首先用一个企业与政府间的合作议价模型框架分析了国有部门的工资和就业决定机制。以这一基本模型为基础，我们比较了二元就业体制下国有部门和非国有部门不同的工资与就业决定机制，并证明政府对国有部门工资和就业的管制是造成不同所有制企业间效率差异的重要因素。之后我们通过比较静态分析考察了模型的一些外生变量对企业均衡的工资和就业，以及企业效率的影响，其中，我们所特别关注的是企业的激励机制改革对企业效率的影响。第七章总结了本文的结论和政策含义，提出了今后的若干研究方向。
Abstract
This
thesis is on wage and employment determination that is the key to understanding
the labor market and the economy. In
the main part of this thesis, we try to answer three questions: (1) How are wage
and employment determined during the economic transition in China? (2) How the
wage and employment determination affects the efficiency of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs)? (3) Why has the difference in labor productivity between
SOEs and non-SOEs enlarged during the employment system reform? To answer these
questions we have applied
bargaining theory, and the model we build has also developed the wage and
employment bargaining theory.
Similar
to other transitional economies, China’s economic system during transition has
inherited many legacies from her traditional planned system. What’s different
is that China has reformed her system gradually and has some distinct
institutional features. As for employment system, wage and employment in state
sector are still regulated by the government, while in the non-state sector they
can be freely determined. In the state sector, with the impact of the
traditional system, labors have not been well organized, for instance, through
trade unions, to bargain with employers on wage and employment. In contrast,
labors in the non-state sector have relatively higher wage and their employers
have more rights in dismissing employees, so employees lack power and incentive
to strive for higher wage and more employment. Considering this institutional
background, this thesis models the impact that employees have on wage by an
efficiency wage mechanism. That is to say, the employees can at least choose
their efforts. Thus, when firms determine their wage and employment,
employees’ reaction must be taken into consider. The critical difference
concerning the employment system between state and non-state sector is that SOEs’
wage and employment are still regulated. To increase employment and control wage
growth were governmental objectives under the traditional system, but during the
transition the control is not coercive any more. SOEs have formed their
profit-maximizing goals, and managers pursue their economic interests as well.
For enterprises and the government both have effects on policy-making, wage and
employment determination can be modeled as a bargaining process, in which wage
and employment are determined under the interaction of firms’ and governmental
objectives.
The
answers to the second and third questions are combined with each other. We try
to verify that governmental intervention with SOEs’ wage and employment
determination has maintained social stability, but also worsened SOEs’
efficiency. A further reasoning is that although we can’t deny the
relationship between ownership and SOEs’ poor efficiency, it might be better
to begin our analysis on SOEs’ poor efficiency from governmental intervention.
The theory in this thesis has shown that during the transition the efficiency
difference between state and non-state sector might be explained by the dual
employment system. We have also verified that under the wage and employment
regulation, the better are the managers incentivised, the more will they pursue
governmental goals by increasing employment and compressing wage. Thus, with
wage and employment regulation remaining, the incentive scheme reform has not
improved SOEs’ performances, but has led them to the opposite direction.
Additionally, following the route of employment system reform, firms with worse
performances are firstly denationalized, so the remaining SOEs are better ones,
whose wage and employment are still regulated by the government. Thus, compared
with non-SOEs, the difference of labor productivity between enterprises of
different ownership enlarged during the reform.
The
main conclusions of this thesis are: (1) SOEs’ wage and employment are
regulated during the transition, so SOEs have a certain scale of disguised
unemployment and their wage are compressed. Both variables are not at their
profit- maximizing level. (2) During the reform, worse SOEs are denationalized
or closed while their employment system reformed, but better SOEs remain to be
regulated. However, better performances are more or less an excuse to postpone
their employment system reform. Still under the wage and employment regulation,
the remaining SOEs might have a lower and lower wage and labor productivity
relative to non-SOEs, and the incentive scheme reform could only deteriorate
SOEs’ performances.
The
policy implication of this thesis is evident. To enable SOEs to compete with
non-SOEs, and to make the incentive scheme reform more efficient, the government
should remove the regulation on SOEs’ wage and employment. And to change the
institutional framework that SOEs bargain with government on wage and
employment, SOEs’ personnel management system should also be reformed to
remove governmental goals from what SOEs pursue.
The
initiatives of this thesis are: (1) We have explained why the difference of
labor productivity between enterprises of different ownership has enlarged
during the reform. The theory has been based on the modeling of wage and
employment determination in SOEs. The theoretical finding is that effective
incentive scheme reform should be based on deregulation; otherwise the reform
will go to the opposite direction. We have provided new insight to understanding
SOEs’ efficiency and its change. In comparison, the existing theories could
neither well explain why the labor productivity in SOEs has deteriorated
relative to non-SOEs, nor address the effects of deregulation on economic
efficiency. (2) If we sort wage and employment bargaining models by the players
and institutional background, then we have four groups of such models:
firm/union (workers) bargaining model under market system, firm/government
bargaining model under market system, firm/union (workers) bargaining model
under transitional system, and firm/ government bargaining model under
transitional system. The existing models belong in the first three groups, while
the model in this thesis is the only one belonging in the fourth. Thus, our
model has developed the wage and employment bargaining models. (3) This thesis
has built the first model of government/firm wage and employment bargaining in
China’s SOEs. The survey of the existing wage and employment bargaining and
the related application is the pioneer in Chinese literature that provides a
good start to spread the theory in China.
This
thesis is structured as follows: Preceded by the introduction, the second
chapter reviews the bargaining theory and its development. Great emphasis has
been laid on two branches of bargaining theories: axiomatic cooperative
bargaining theory sponsored by Nash, and strategic non-cooperative bargaining
theory represented by Rubinstein model. Chapter 3 is a review of wage and
employment bargaining theory including two famous firm/union bargaining model,
right-to-management model and efficient-bargaining model, and a firm/government
employment bargaining model. Chapter 4 starts the analysis on wage and
employment determination in transitional economies. Besides a review on related
literature, we also build a firm/workers bargaining model with wage ceiling
regulation that is based on Eastern European experience.
From
the fifth chapter, we begin to study wage and employment determination and its
effects on economic efficiency during China’s transition. Chapter 5
illustrates the transitional dual employment system, and defines different wage
and employment determination mechanism in state and non-state sectors. We make
it clear why axiomatic approach can be applied to the analysis on wage and
employment determination during China’s transition. Meanwhile, we have also
discussed the role that government, firms and workers play in wage and
employment bargaining. In the sixth chapter, we build a firm/government
cooperative bargaining model to analyze SOEs’ wage and employment
determination. With this model, we compare the different wage and employment
determination in state and non-state sector, and verify that regulation on SOEs’
wage and employment is an important factor causing efficiency difference between
enterprises of different ownership type. Then through comparative static
analysis, we studied the how the exogenous variables affect the equilibrium wage
and employment, and the efficiency of enterprises. What we have especially
addressed is the effects of incentive scheme reform on firms’ efficiency. The
seventh chapter concludes and puts forward some policy implications as well as
some directions for future study.
